In December 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation (PSLRA) Act over a veto by President Bill Clinton. 2 The Act sought to reduce abusive litigation and coercive settlements in securities lawsuits. 3 Specifically, the PSLRA enacted several measures to accomplish these objectives, including: (1) replacing joint and several liability with proportionate liability under certain circumstances; (2) reducing the preference in the appointment of lead plaintiff (and lead plaintiffs' counsel) previously given to the first plaintiff (and law firm) to file a class action; (3) staying discovery pending a motion to dismiss; (4) including a 90-day "bounce-back rule in measuring damages;" and (5) including negative causation in the statutory language under section 12, giving the plaintiff the burden of proving that acts or omissions in an SEC filing by the defendant caused the damage for which the plaintiff is seeking to recover. 4 Despite such sweeping legislative changes, the success of the PSLRA remains an open question.
In October 1998, Congress determined that the PSLRA had not been able to "fully achieve its objectives" since evidence indicated that securities class action lawsuits were being shifted from federal to state courts to frustrate the PSLRA's objectives. 5 To curb this problem, Congress enacted further private securities legislation through the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act. 6 The new Act's aim is "to enact national standards for securities class action lawsuits involving nationally traded securities, while preserving the appropriate enforcement powers of State securities regulators and not changing the current treatment of individual lawsuits." 7 The analysis herein is organized into two Parts. Part II describes the sample and analyzes the trends in the filing and 2. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 , Pub. L. No. 104-369, 109 Stat. 737 (1995 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § § 77z-1 to 78u-4 (1995))
Time Trends
In Figure 1 we present the frequency of filings over time for the total sample of 2,167 federal cases and 579 state cases. 1 3 The number of cases filed in federal courts immediately following PSLRA dropped from 191 in 1995 to 119 in 1996.14 8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part II. However, there was no parallel drop in state court filings. Interestingly, even the decline in federal court filings noted in 1996 reversed itself soon thereafter. By 1998, federal court filings had reached an all-time high of 248 filings, while state filings had declined from 80 in 1996 to 59 by 1998 and further to 32 by 1999. In Figure 2 we show the frequency of filings for our final sample of 1,203 federal and 92 state cases that we examine in detail in this paper. 
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Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 after reviewing evidence that securities lawsuits were shifting from federal to state courts to circumvent legislative measures introduced by PSLRA.16 Figure 1 presents the frequency of filings over time for the total initial sample of 2,167 federal cases and 579 state cases. The table reveals that immediately after the enactment of the PSLRA, cases filed in federal courts dropped from 191 in 1995 to 119 in 1996, while cases filed in state courts increased from 65 to 80.17 This trend confirms Congress' belief that cases were being shifted to frustrate the objectives of the PSLRA.
This trend, however, was not long-lived, as the decline in federal court filings in 1996 reversed itself soon thereafter. 18 By 1998, federal court filings had reached an all-time high of 248 16 . See SLUSA CONF. REP., supra note 5 at 1-2. 17. See supra fig.1 .
See id.
filings, while state filings had declined from 80 in 1996 to 59 by 1998.19 This data indicates that even before the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 was formally passed, the tendency to shift from federal to state courts had diminished. This trend may have been in anticipation of the uniform standards in state and federal courts that lawmakers were contemplating at the time and which were eventually enacted in October 1998.20 Table 1 classifies our sample according to various types of allegations based on our reading of description of the case description provided by Securities Class Action Alert. 21 We classified each of the cases in our database into ten categories of allegations that involved one or more of the following claims: (1) defendant made misleading or false statements; (2) defendant failed to disclose material information; (3) defendant violated corporate disclosure rules; (4) defendant breached fiduciary responsibilities; (5) registration/ proxy statement included false or misleading statements; (6) officers of defendant firm violated insider-trading rules; (7) defendant made false revenue disclosures, which required a restatement; (8) the statements made at the IPO were false or misleading; (9) defendant was involved in improper accounting practices; and (10) defendants were involved in improper Revenue recognition. Securities cases often include multiple allegations. Therefore, classifying cases by allegation type is not mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, a vast majority of cases alleged misleading statements by the company's management. In 1999 alone, 97 such suits were filed. 22 In contrast, the remaining nine allegation categories combined included only 80 cases filed in 1999.23 The disparity in filings across allegation types is less stark for the pre-PSLRA period. For instance, in the pre-PSLRA period, cases alleging defendants' failure to disclose material information (the second most common allegation) were never less than 69% of cases that alleged false or misleading statements (the most common allegation). 24 In the post-PSLRA period, however, cases alleging defendants' failure to disclose material information never exceeded 69%. In 1999, such cases were as low as 28% of cases that alleged false or misleading statements. 25 Insider trading cases receive considerable public attention. Yet, Table 1 reveals that relatively few cases actually involve such an allegation. Cases alleging accounting malpractice, such as those involving revenue restatements, improper revenue recognition, or other accounting malpractice increased during the post-PSLRA period. 26 Revenue restatement-related cases have increased from 10 filed before 1996 to 41 filed since 1996.27 Revenue recognition-related cases have also increased significantly from 9 filed in the pre-PSLRA period to 27 filed in the post-PSLRA period. 28 Filings alleging improper accounting practices have increased from 21 in the pre-PSLRA period to 41 in the post-PSLRA period. 29
Filings Across Different Allegation Types
Filings Involving Multiple Defendants
Even though investors may rely on information from a firm's auditors or investment banks serving as underwriters, relatively few securities class action lawsuits have been filed against such co-defendants. Figure 3 indicates that in the post-PSLRA period only 2.3% cases involved the firm's auditor as co- For the purpose ofanalysing settlement trends, we relied on a sub-sample of the SCAA dataset that met the following four criteria. (1) Stock market data on the firm was available in CRSP (Center for Research and Security Prices). (2) A class period could be defined for the case. (3) The case pertained to a security violation only. (4) Potential Investment Losses data on the firm was available in CRSP. Table I is based on this final sample that comprises of 1,203 federal case filings and 92 state court filings, spanning from 1988 to 1999. Prior to 1991, there were a total of 132 Federal court, II State court, and 3 unidentified filings that were included in our final sample. Prior to 1991, there were a total of 17 filings with accounting co-defendants, and 16 with underwriter co-defendants. 
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Moreover, there was a marked decline in cases against either type of co-defendant in 1998 and 1999 compared to earlier years. 31 For instance, in 1999, only one case involved an accounting firm as a co-defendant and only five involved an underwriting firm as a co-defendant. 32 In contrast, in 1997, 11 cases involved an accounting firm as a co-defendant and 23 involved an underwriting firm as a co-defendant. Table 5 shows the number of dismissals for our sample of security class actions.
Filings by Court
C. Speed of Dismissals
36.
See infra tbl.4.
See id.
38. There may be a variety of reasons why settlement and dismissal speeds declined in the post-PSLRA period. For example, one possible interpretation may be that cases filed in the post-PSLRA period are perceived ex ante to have more merit than cases filed in the pre-PSLRA period, which has made the settlement process more protracted. Our data do not allow us to determine which of these reasons, if any, explain our findings. Therefore, here and throughout the paper we provide descriptive statistics and avoid speculation as to the underlying reasons for trends not ascertainable from data alone. Table 6 shows the speed at which these cases were dismissed. Only 10.89% of all cases filed were dismissed within four years and 11.24% of all cases filed were dismissed in 5 years during the pre-PSLRA period. 39 An even smaller fraction (5.79%) was dismissed within four years in the post-PSLRA period. 
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III. SETTLEMENTS
The primary purpose of this paper is to examine trends in settlements. Settlements depend on the potential loss borne by investors. We therefore consider three different measures of settlements: the dollar amount of settlement, the settlement relative to damage calculations using the plaintiff style model, and the maximum loss in market value of the company stock during the class period. To measure the plaintiff style damages we use a proportional decay model and define inflation as the difference between the stock price and an industry index. The market capitalization drop is the difference between the highest value of the market capitalization during the class period and the market capitalization on the day after the end of the class period.
A. Settlement Amounts Categorized by Time Taken for Settlement
Mean and median settlement amounts tend to increase the longer a case takes to settle. 41 This trend is especially noticeable in the post-PSLRA period. For instance, of all 111 cases filed in 1996, just one settled within the year for $500,000.42 However, of these 111 cases, 14 settled in 1997, 15 settled in 1998 and 14 settled in 1999. 43 The mean settlement amount for the 14 cases settled in 1997 was $4.690 million, whereas the mean increased to $7.571 million for the 14 cases that took two extra years to settle (i.e., settled in 1999). The median settlement amounts display a similar trend. The median settlement amount for cases filed in 1996 and settled in 1997 was $2.7 million.
44
Table 8. Median Settlement Amount and Number of Cases Settled by Year
For the purpose of analysing settlement trends, we relied on a sub-aiople of the SCAA dataset tar met the following faurcrinea. (I) Stck tarket data on the firm was talable in CRSP (Center for Restarch and Security Prices). (2) A class period could be defmed for the case. (3) The case pertained to a security vioLation only. (4) Potential Investmtent Lasses data on the firm was available in CRSP. NoteSttlenart Amounts ass in millions. I-) Thisn naber indicates that numberofceaes settled in different year corresponding to the specific filing year.
44. See infra tbl.8.
However, the median settlement amount increased to $6 million for cases settled two years later. 45 Note that these results do not necessarily illustrate that the expected settlement amount depends on the speed with which a settlement is reached. We should not over-interpret this empirical regularity and assume that settling a case with utmost speed will reduce expected settlement amount. Large and complex cases may take longer to resolve and also produce higher settlement amounts.
B. Settlement Amounts Categorized by the Alleged Damages
We next examined various settlement statistics for all settled cases that fell within a particular range. 46 These ranges were defined in terms of either (a) potential investor loss (PIL),47 or (b) settlement amount. 
Potential Investor Loss
Settlements often depend on the potential loss borne by investors. Thus, in addition to considering the dollar amount of settlements, the paper analyzes settlements relative to PIL, which is measured either by the defendant's "market capitalization drop" or by comparing the defendant's stock price performance relative to an "industry-specific index." The "market capitalization drop" measures the difference between the highest value of the market capitalization during the class period and the market capitalization on the day after the end of the class period. Alternatively, PIL may be calculated by comparing the defendant's stock price to an index of the security prices of other firms in the same industry (as classified by the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification code).49
The "industry-specific index" approach uses a proportional decay model to calculate the number of affected shares. PoIen1I In--elen L-se in nilion Table 9 presents the mean and median PIL amounts for cases that were settled in a given year, in which PIL is measured using the industry index approach. 50 The majority of settled cases each involved a large PILs (over $10 million), regardless of the methodology adopted.
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Of the 807 settled cases in the sample, 79% (637 cases) had a PIL over $10 million using the industry index approach. An even higher percentage (92%, or 743 cases) of the settled cases involve PILs over $10 million when PIL is measured using the market drop approach. Even though the PIL for most cases is greater than $10 million, the majority of settled cases (80%, or 643 cases) actually settled for less than $10 million as shown in Table 12 .4 Thus, it is clear that although most settled cases involved a large PIL, the actual settlement amount was considerably smaller.
Settlement to Potential Investor Loss Ratios
The mean Settlement/Potential Investor Loss (S/PIL) ratio for each potential investor loss range is shown in the fifth column of Table 11 Panels A and B. It is clear that the mean S/PIL ratio declined steadily as the PIL range increased. 55 Similarly, the fifth column of Table 12 presents the mean ratio corresponding to specific settlement ranges.
As Table 12 indicates, the S/PIL does not decline for larger settlement ranges. 56 This observation makes common sense. For a case in which potential investment losses are small, plaintiffs are unlikely to file a lawsuit unless expected recovery is a large fraction of alleged losses. On the other hand, a large investor loss can prompt filing of a lawsuit even if the expected recovery as a percentage of potential investor losses is small.
Comparing the fifth column of Table 11 (Panel A), to the fifth column of Table 11 (Panel B), reveals that the mean S/PIL was much higher for most PIL ranges when PIL was computed using the "industry index" approach instead of the "market drop" approach. 57 Thus, the former method of computing PIL approximates the settlement amount more closely. 5 8 This comparison also suggests that actual settlement discussions were likely to have considered the performance of a "damaged" stock 59 relative an industry index rather than simply examined the stock's market price drop in isolation.
Comparing Tables 11 and 12 also indicates a difference in the terms of settlements across various ranges. Column 6 of Tables 11 and 12 provides the percentage of all settled cases, within the specified PIL or settlement range, which had noncash settlements. 60 Of settled cases, 25% (159 of 637) with PIL greater than $10 million involved non-cash settlements. 61 However, such cases with settlement amounts greater than $10 million represent only 13% of settled cases (22 of 164).62 57. See supra tbl.11. Defendants are not accountable for change in stock price that can be explained by a general decline in the market and/or specific industry that reflects macro-economic reasons unrelated to any alleged wrongdoing. Therefore, it is well-accepted technique to estimate damages after adjusting for the change in stock price of "similar" firms. This approach is usually implemented by using an index of stocks. See NICHOLAS I. CREW ET" AL. 58. If a lawsuit is more likely after a stock price decline and if industry-wide and other macro-economic factors account for a portion of the observed stock price declines, one would expect that S/PIL ratio would be lower when an industryindex approach is used. See id. 59. A "damaged" stock refers to a stock that has faced a large stock price decline, which precipitated the suit.
60. There may be various reasons for non-cash settlements, including limits on the defendant's ability to pay cash. Sometime offering warrants or stock in the defendant company as part of a settlement may be an attempt to provide plaintiffs with a stake in preserving the economic viability of the defendant.
61. See supra tbl.11 (col.6). 62. See supra tbl.12, (col.6). Table 11 indicates that at least 23% of settled cases with PILs in any range greater than $10 million involved non-cash settlements. Table 12 indicates that cases which settled for an amount in the $10 million to $49.99 million range, only 14.89% included non-cash settlements. For the purpose ofanalysing sclanint trends, te reltied on a sub-srople ofihe SCAA dalasel that nct the following four criteria. (1) Stoch eurket data on he fino was availible in CRSP (Center for Research and Security Prices). (2) A class period could be defined for the case. (3) The case Pertained to a security violation only. 14) Potential Investrent Losses data on the fian was available in CRSP. Once again, the average S/PIL ratio is much higher over time when PIL is measured using industry index method 64 rather than the market drop method. 65 For instance, for cases filed in 1996 and settled in 1997, the average S/PIL was 16.50% when the PIL was measured using the industry index approach and 4.89% when the PIL was based on the market drop approach. 66 Similarly, for cases filed in 1996 and settled in 1999, that no cases which settled for an amount in the $50 million to $99.99 million range included non-cash settlements and that only 14.29% of the cases which settled for an amount over $100 million included non-cash settlements.
63. Potential investor loss (PIL) simply represents the decline in wealth faced by shareholders as a result of decline in stock price of the subject company. To the extent that such a decline cannot generally be proven as being entirely driven by the alleged wrongdoing, one would normally expect PIL to be larger than settlements. Also, given the litigation risk, plaintiffs would normally be expected to settle for an amount less than what they can reasonably expect to recover. Therefore, on average, PIL is expected to be significantly larger than settlements.
64. See supra tbl.13 (Panel B the average S/PIL is 18.31% using the industry index approach and 9.86% based on the market drop approach. Table 14 , Panels A and B, presents the median S/PIL using the two alternative approaches to measure PIL. There are significant differences between Tables 13 and 14. First, Table 13 demonstrates that cases that take longer to settle typically involved higher average (mean) S/PIL. Although this trend is not particularly noticeable in the pre-PSLRA period (pre-1991 through 1995) , it is more apparent for cases filed in the post-PSLRA (1996 through 1999) period. 68 However, a similar trend cannot be noted in the median S/PIL ratios, even in the post-PSLRA period. 69 This data suggests that the "trend" in the case of average S/PIL ratios in Table 13 is likely due to a statistical phenomenon driven by a few delayed settlements that are significantly larger than their corresponding PIL.
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A comparison of Tables 13 and 14 S/PIL ratios. Once again, it suggests that the average S/PIL ratio is skewed by a few large settlements relative to PIL. It should be noted, however, that the disparity in the mean S/PIL to the corresponding median S/PIL is most apparent when PIL is measured using the industry index approach. 70 This disparity is far less noticeable when the PIL is computed using the market drop approach. This is probably due to the fact that the S/PIL is much smaller to begin with in the latter case. Disparities in mean ratios relative to median ratios are, thus, unlikely to be large. It is apparent that the mean and median settlement amounts are higher for cases settled in the post-PSLRA period compared to those settled before 1996.72 The mean settlement amount for the pre-PSLRA period is $8.01 million, compared to $18.09 70. See supra tbls.13, 14 (Panels B, respectively). 71. Table 15 uses a PIL computed using the market drop approach, whereas Table 14 relied on a PIL computed using the industry index approach.
C. Settlement Characteristics over Time
72. See supra tbl.15. million in the post-PSLRA period. 73 Similarly, the median settlement is $3.5 million in the pre-PSLRA period compared to $4.24 million in the post-PSLRA period. 74 Settlement terms did not change significantly across these two sub-periods. While 18.9% of cases settled in the pre-PSLRA period involved noncash settlements, this proportion increases slightly to 21.9% in the post-PSLRA period. 75 The percentage of cases with miscellaneous settlement terms remained almost unchanged.
76
The number of settlements is approximately equal in the two sub-periods. Out of 807 settled cases in our sample, 48% (388) settled in the pre-PSLRA period, while 52% (419) cases settled in the post-PSLRA period. 77 There was a moderate decline in both the mean and median S/PIL ratios in the post-PSLRA period with PIL measured using the industry index approach. 78 However, the mean and median S/PIL are not significantly different across the two-periods when the PIL was computed using the market drop approach. Table 16 indicates that 82 cases in our sample involved accounting firms as co-defendants and 171 cases involved underwriting firms as co-defendants. 76. See id. The percentages were 10.59% in the pre-PSLRA period compared to 11.62% in the post-PSLRA period. See supra tbl.15.
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D. Settlement Characteristics Across Different Co-defendant Types
77. See id.
78. See supra tbl.14.
79. See supra tbl.15. Note Potential Invcetmnt Losses ad Settnant Anonte a in millione I*) Forceach settetcont in tha diferent category, we calculated nettlemnt / PIL This coluin preents the arithmetic man ofthis ratio fon each category.
Cases involving accounting firms rarely go to trial. Every case that involved a "Big 5" accounting firm 80 was settled, except for those that involved Ernst &Young. 8 ' Of the cases involving Ernst &Young, 92.86% were settled. 82 In contrast, only 78.36% of cases involving underwriter co-defendants were settled. 83 The settlement terms did not vary significantly between the various co-defendants.
84
The median settlement amounts did differ considerably between cases involving different accounting firms and underwriter firms. Most notably, cases that involved Ernst &Young, which were less likely to settle, also had the highest mean and median settlement amounts, $ 261.5 million and $13.825 million, respectively. 85 for cases against accounting or underwriting firms were much greater than the mean and median for the sample as a whole.
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For the sample as a whole, mean settlements are $8 million for the pre-PSLRA period and $18 million for the post-PSLRA period. 87 In contrast, for cases involving co-defendants (and for the pre-and post-PSLRA period combined), the mean settlement ranges from $9.38 million to $261.525 million, depending on the co-defendant involved.
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For the sample as a whole, the median settlements were $3.5 million for the pre-PSLRA period and $4.25 million for the post-PSLRA period. 89 In contrast, for cases involving co-defendants (and for the pre-and post-PSLRA period combined), the median settlement ranged from $1.675 million to $13.825 million depending on the co-defendant involved. 9°T he mean and median S/PIL ratios varied considerably by co-defendant. When PIL is defined using the industry index method, the mean S/PIL for cases involving underwriting firms (26.23%) was significantly lower than cases involving most accounting firms other than Arthur Andersen and PricewaterhouseCoopers.
91
The mean S/PIL in cases that involved Arthur Andersen and PricewaterhouseCoopers were 7.35% and 6.7%, respectively.
92
The median S/PIL for cases involving underwriting firms (11.63%) is strikingly similar to that of cases involving non-Big 5 accounting firms other than the Big 5 firms (11.53%) and those involving Deloitte & Touche (11.86%) .93 However, the median S/PIL for cases involving any of the other Big 5 accounting firms was significantly lower. 94 In cases involving Ernst & Young, the median S/PIL was 8.65%. 95 The median was below 5% for cases Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 128 F. Supp. 2d 401 (S.D. Tex. 2000) ; In re Cendant Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 285 (D. N.J. 2000) .
86. See supra tbl.16.
87. See supra tbl.8. As previously noted, in the post-PSLRA period cases that took longer to settle and usually had higher S/PIL ratios. Therefore, it is not surprising that settlement dollars were higher in the post-PSLRA period for the sample as a whole. involving any of the remaining three of the Big 5 accounting firms. 96 The disparity in the median S/PIL of cases involving various co-defendants is far less when the PIL is computed using the market drop approach. 97 Finally, as noted earlier, the disparity between the mean and median S/PIL is also significant for most cases.
E. Settlements for Different Types of Allegations
The majority of cases considered involved disclosurerelated allegations as shown in Table 17 .98 Table 17 . Settlement Statistics by Allegation Type
For the purposc ofunalystng sctlement trends, we trelied on a sub sa4plI ofthe SCAA datasat that int the following four criteria. (I) Stock mlarket data on t he fin was availob le in CRSP (Center for Research and Socu ity Piucs). (2) A class period coul be dofired for the oas. (3) The case pertained to a security violation only, (4) Potential lovestment Losses data on the finttas avilablein CRSP. Settlement terms did not vary significantly between cases involving different types of allegations. 99 The median settlement amount is generally similar for all types of allegations and ranged between $2.675 million and $4.5 million, except for cases that alleged improper accounting practice, for which the median settlement was $10.0 million. 1 0 0 Interestingly, however, even though cases involving improper accounting practice allegations faced the highest median settlement, this category's median S/PIL was not especially high (median S/PIL ratio of 6.78% using the industry index approach).
1°1 This result held true for revenue recognition-related allegations, which had the second highest median settlement ($8.8 million), but a low median S/PIL ratio (5.32% using the industry index approach. 1 0 2 This suggests that the PIL (using the industry index approach) is significantly larger for improper accounting practice and revenue recognition related cases compared to cases involving other types of allegations. It is also worth noting in this context, that initial public offering (IPO) related allegations resulted in the highest median S/PIL using the industry index approach (14%) and the second-highest median S/PIL using the market drop approach (3.06%).
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The mean and median S/PIL varied considerably among cases involving various types of allegations when PIL was measured using the industry index approach. 1°4 This difference in mean and median S/PIL is less pronounced when PIL is measured using the market drop approach 0 5 Moreover, the mean and median S/PIL is generally much higher according to the former approach. 1 0 6 The mean S/PIL ranges from 6.63% to 33% using the industry index approach and from 2.03% to 7.13% using the market drop approach.' 0 7 Similarly, the median S/PIL ranges from 4.30% to 14% using the industry index approach and from 1.35% to 3.08% using the market drop approach. This law firm filed 408 cases or 31% of all filings. Milberg Weiss cases settle for a median amount that is 61% higher than the median settlements in cases involving other attorneys ($4.5 million compared to $2.8 million). The mean settlement for cases in which Milberg Weiss was the lead counsel is lower than that for cases in which other plaintiff firms were the lead counsel However, the comparison of the mean settlement amounts is misleading because it is being driven by a couple of large settlements (e.g., the largest settlement during the time period of our study is a 3.15 billion dollar settlement for Cendant Corporation in which Milberg was not the lead plaintiff's counsel). If the two largest settlements were excluded, Milberg's average settlement would be greater than the average settlement for other plaintiff firms. It is important to note that these numbers cannot be used to draw inferences about whether the handling of cases by Milberg Weiss are in any way different from the other plaintiff attorneys.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS This paper analyzed a comprehensive sample of security class action settlements. The final sample for which stock market data is also available includes 1,203 federal and 92 state filings spanning from 1988 to 1999. The paper contrasts settlement figures with two estimates of potential investor defendants, while relatively rare, involve average and median settlements that are greater than the sample as a whole.
10. The median settlement, as well as the PIL (measured using the industry index method), are significantly higher in cases involving improper accounting practice or revenue recognition allegation compared to other types of allegations.
11. Settlements as a percentage of PIL vary considerably across federal circuit courts.
